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Abstract: Over the past decade, Venezuela has moved into a deep recession, which has 
resulted in millions migrating abroad. In February 2019, the United States and its allies 
recognized the interim government of Juan Guaidó, engaging in a standoff with the 
government of Nicolás Maduro. This article carries out a nuanced analysis of the situation 
in Venezuela across multiple levels as it problematizes our ontological understanding of 
individuals, states, and international system. Through a post-structuralist approach to 
security, I argue that individuals have been portrayed in contradictory humanitarian 
discourses as a means of advancing particular political interests. Furthermore, I critically 
analyze the role of space, time, and multilateralism, and their subsequent effects for the 21st 
century global order. 
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Resumen: Durante la última década, Venezuela ha entrado en una profunda recesión eco-
nómica, que ha provocado que millones emigren al extranjero. En febrero de 2019, los Es-
tados Unidos y sus aliados reconocieron al gobierno interino de Juan Guaidó, creando un 
enfrentamiento con el gobierno de Nicolás Maduro. Este artículo realiza un análisis pro-
fundo de la situación en Venezuela a través de múltiples niveles al problematizar nuestra 
comprensión ontológica de individuos, estados y el sistema internacional. Con un enfoque 
postestructuralista de la seguridad, sostengo que los individuos han sido retratados en dis-
cursos humanitarios contradictorios de manera de promover intereses políticos particula-
res. Además, analizo críticamente el papel del espacio, el tiempo y el multilateralismo, y sus 
efectos posteriores para el orden mundial del siglo XXI. 
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1. Introduction 
Michael Reid begins his 2007 ominously titled book Forgotten Continent: The Battle 
for Latin America’s Soul by asking, in a world of challenging security dilemmas, changing 
economic markets and development patterns, and ever-shifting discourses of power: “But 
what of Latin American, the other great region of the developing world” (Reid, 2007, p. 1)? 
This article attempts to partially answer this question by focusing on the region’s current 
largest political debate and hotspot, Venezuela, and how understanding the discursive 
struggle for this South American country can provide some insight into regional and global 
moves for power and hegemony. Specifically, I seek to carry out a theoretical analysis of the 
situation in Venezuela, and more broadly of regional affairs, to see how this analysis can 
help us make sense of humanitarian assistance, multilateral actions, and relations of power 
in the region. 
Over the past decade, Venezuela has entered a period of economic turmoil with hy-
perinflation averaging 80,000% in 2018 alone, and the number of Venezuelans going abroad 
in search of better opportunities spiking from 700,000 in 2015 to an estimated 3.4 million in 
2019, 1.5 million of whom migrated to other South American countries alone (Cara Labrador 
and Merrow, 2019; O’Grady, Alcantara, and Emamdjomeh, 2019). Without a doubt, there 
exists a deep academic and social debate about who is to blame for this situation, whether 
that be poor macro-economic mismanagement since the presidency of Hugo Chávez and 
continued policy failure under Nicolás Maduro, or hostile sabotage and crippling sanctions 
from the United States (U.S.) starting with the administration of George W. Bush. It is be-
yond the scope of this article, however, to review the successes and failures of the Bolivarian 
Revolution and to properly apportion blame among the parties, as that would entail an em-
pirical and quantitative review of figures, and it would probably still fail to fully capture the 
nuances presently unfolding in Venezuela. The purpose of this article is instead to focus on 
the discourse and discursive practices that have been employed by various groups to define 
and interpret the situation in Venezuela. Likewise, I focus my analysis on recent events, spe-
cifically since the election of Donald Trump3 in the U.S. in 2016, and the proclamation of 
Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition, as interim president of Venezuela in February, 2019. 
Overall, I argue that Venezuela’s current situation allows us to understand how indi-
viduals can be constituted simultaneously through opposing, and often contradictory, hu-
manitarian discourses to serve various political purposes. Furthermore, I advance the idea 
that this case study illustrates how both right-wing and left-wing leaders can utilize multi-
lateralism to further their masculine image and reassert their political dominance within 
both domestic and foreign policy circles. In essence, this article provides a post-structuralist 
reading of the “crisis” in Venezuela to help us problematize this term and its implications for 
world order and political hegemonies, as well as how social discourses are employed across 
various times and spaces to aid in the production of individuals, states, and identities. The 
events examined in this article are still in development, and will probably continue to de-
velop over the next decade, hence this is a first attempt at placing “the Venezuelan crisis” 
                                                          
3 Furthermore, my analysis focuses on the implications of the election of several center-right leaders in recent 
years throughout Latin America: Mauricio Macri in Argentina in 2015, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in Peru in 2016, 
Sebastián Piñera in 2017 in Chile, Iván Duque in Colombia in 2018, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil in 2018, etc. This 
electoral shift signifies a transition from the “Pink Tide” that had previously dominated regional politics.  
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within the grander legacy of Latin American politics and the constitution of 21st century in-
ternational politics. 
2. (Re)Conceptualizing Security and the State 
Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State, and War (1959) can be viewed as a fundamental text 
within the field of International Relations (IR), not only because it established neorealism 
and pushed the field’s theoretical discussions into its so-called “second debate”, but more 
importantly because it framed how subsequent scholars learn about and analyze IR. Stated 
differently, Waltz’s division of political space among three images, the individual, the state, 
and the international system, has anchored mainstream IR’s thinking towards questions of 
conflict and peace. Even post-structuralist and post-modern thought, as is the case of Rich-
ard Ashley’s (1989) theoretical endeavors, takes Waltz’s three images as its starting point 
for critique. My objective here, as has been advanced by many post-structuralist thinkers, is 
not to suggest that we live in a world of mirages and illusions – but instead to propose that 
we view individuals, states, and the international system as mutually co-constituted entities 
that are in a constant state of reproduction and rearticulation vis-à-vis each other (Camp-
bell, 1992; Der Derian, 2009a; Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989; Doty, 1993; Hansen, 1997; 
Shapiro, 1997, 2007). Furthermore, it is their very materiality that makes it difficult to ap-
preciate this co-constituted quality about them. 
To put it differently, one could apply Cynthia Weber’s line of reasoning about the phal-
lus to Waltz’s three images, or as she states when exploring the works of Butler and Lacan, 
“although it is impossible to ‘be’ or to ‘have’ the phallus, it is not impossible to ‘appear’ (not) 
to be or (not) to have the phallus. This is the very sense of pretending, the ‘seems to’ space 
in a Lacanian economy of desire. It is the space of masquerade” (1999, p. 109). Thus, indi-
viduals, states, and the international system can be refashioned not as well-delineated and 
separate entities that exist apart from each other, or as objects that “are” or “have” partic-
ular characteristics – but rather as entities that exist in tandem with each other and that 
appear to be or to have. Once again, I do not challenge the materiality or “thing-ness” of the 
world around us. I simply suggest that nothing exists outside itself, or beyond the discursive 
universe of socially rendered relations of power and symbolic systems of understanding that 
have been constituted by human societies across millennia (Derrida, 1997; Foucault, 1978, 
1980; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). If Simon Dalby provocatively asks, “What then might secu-
rity mean without states?” (Dalby, 1992, p. 106, cited in Hansen, 1997, p. 380), I further that 
inquiry by asking in the context of Venezuela’s current situation: What might then security 
mean without individuals, states, and the international system – or at least our present on-
tology regarding these three entities? 
The answer might circuitously lead us back to Waltz’s three mirror images; emphasis 
here is on the word “mirror”, because mirrors hold a special place within the Western psy-
che and semiotic process stemming from their simultaneous ability to reflect back objects 
as they appear to be, or to distort the objects that are placed before them (see Onuf, 1995). 
What I am implying is that security studies is a field centered on who/what is the proper 
referent object of security, be that individuals or states (Krause and Williams, 1997). Or to 
quote Hansen: 
By ‘saying security’ the particular case is characterized as extraordinarily 
important, and it is moved into a special area where extraordinary means 
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can be used… This points at the self-referring character of security dis-
courses, it is not the threat of military force which in itself characterizes the 
security discourse, it is the successful construction of a threat which ‘we’ 
have to act upon (1997, p. 376-377, italics in original). 
Thus, a critical approach to security studies is one that recognizes an intersubjective 
relationship between Waltz’s three images whereby they co-constitute each other, yet at 
the same time appear to have a degree of distinction among them (or at least in how they 
are perceived by society at-large). Returning to Hansen, she proposes three “anti-methods” 
(deconstruction, genealogy, and intertextuality) for better understanding international pol-
itics that are of vital importance to our present inquiry, especially deconstruction as it allows 
us to navigate the hierarchical dichotomies that constitute Western thinking in order to 
undo them (1997, p. 372). Approaches to Latin American security tend to oscillate between 
emphasizing either the state or individuals as the proper object of desire for security; this 
article, however, seeks to deconstruct those objects and demonstrate how they are both 
one/whole and many/separate at the same time. 
Moreover, a recent publication, the Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security 
(Mares and Kacowicz, 2016), includes a theoretical sub-section with chapters on neoliberal 
institutionalism, peripheral realism, constructivism, gender, and so forth. Curiously missing 
– or perhaps hidden – is a chapter on post-structuralist or post-modern approaches to Latin 
American security, which seems to imply a greater timeless-ness to Latin America, whereby 
it can possibly only be read through specific lenses: colonial, Cold War, and post-Cold War 
strategic competition. My objective in this article is to contribute towards the academic lit-
erature on Latin American security studies by employing post-structuralist approaches to 
security, which have typically been applied to comprehend U.S. foreign policy for certain 
regions (see Campbell, 1992; Der Derian, 2009b; Shapiro, 1997, 2009, p. 41-63; Solomon, 
2015), but typically not in connection with Latin America. Overall, I seek to demonstrate the 
value of postmodern approaches to IR for understanding a nuanced situation such as the 
one currently unfolding in Venezuela. For the case in point, let us consider Michael Shapiro’s 
words when discussing the ideas of Foucault: 
Michel Foucault put the matter of geographic partisanship succinctly when 
he noted that “territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it is first of 
all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power.” 
Now that global geographies are in flux, as political boundaries become in-
creasingly ambiguous and contested, the questions of power and right are 
more in evidence with respect to the formerly pacified spaces of nation-
states (1997, p. 15). 
I go one step further in this study by proposing that these “global geographies” are 
not only ambiguous or in flux, but I also call into question to what extent “spaces of nation-
states” were ever truly “pacified” and/or well-defined in Latin America. In other words, 
through the theoretical deliberations of the following sections my aim is to partially outline 
the violent cartographies that are unfolding in relation to Venezuela and to make sense of 
this moment in international politics. Shapiro defines this concept in his more recent work 
by stating: 
Violent cartographies are the ‘historically developed, socially embedded 
interpretations of identity and space’ that constitute the frames within 
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which enmities give rise to war-as-policy (Shapiro, 1997: ix). Violent car-
tographies are thus constituted as inter-articulations of geographic imagi-
naries and antagonism, based on models of identity-difference (2007, p. 
293-294). 
In regard to Latin America, one could say that a very specific violent cartography has 
been charted in such region since the arrival of Europeans in 1492, a cartography aimed at 
claiming and reinterpreting enormous parcels of space for the purpose of extraction and 
exploitation (see Burkholder and Johnson, 2010; Galeano, 1997; Schoultz, 1998; Smith, 
2008). The wars of independence imposed a new layer on that violent cartography as white 
Creole elites took the reins of state apparatuses and embarked on their own project to dis-
cipline Latin America’s space and the bodies that occupied it, instituting various discourses 
and modes of citizenship in that process. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine super-imposed an-
other layer on the region’s violent cartography as the U.S. and its imperial reach turned to 
the region as its own privileged space in which to constitute its masculinity, hegemony, and 
identity. To this list one could add many other layers: the Cuban revolution, Cold War, mili-
tary right-wing dictatorships, Washington Consensus, and so forth. “The idea of Latin Amer-
ica” (Mignolo, 2005) is not an ahistorical or atemporal one – it is one that has been succes-
sively mapped out for centuries, and Venezuela’s current situation cannot be divorced from 
this legacy. However, Latin America’s historical legacy should not be taken as the sole means 
through which one can understand Venezuela either, as will be outlined in the following 
sections through my discussion of discourses, multilateralism, and other concepts. 
Mainstream IR scholars might critique this article by saying it misses the material re-
ality of the situation in Venezuela as they reduce it to a single word: oil. My rebuttal is that 
they miss the nuanced processes unfolding around this issue while they insist on viewing 
Venezuela as nothing more than an enormous oil lake, thereby failing to appreciate the im-
portance of individuals, power relations, and inter-state power competitions. Relatedly, the 
objective of this article is not to position itself as either in favor or against any particular side 
of the conflict – rather, I seek to point out the contradictions and drive for power that char-
acterize the rationales and actions of every party involved, from Maduro to Trump, and so 
forth. In a Foucauldian (1978) sense, power is not moral or partisan, it is instead a force or 
a tool that every entity within the global order wants to employ and utilize to serve their 
interests. 
The election of Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela in 1998 marked the beginning 
of a discursive and power dispute for the global positioning of Latin America and its people 
in the 21st century that is still ongoing today. Chávez broke Venezuela’s preexisting com-
pacted “Punto Fijo” democracy and inaugurated a populist and participatory form of de-
mocracy that continuously veered towards authoritarianism, while always trying to maintain 
the appearance of democracy (Balderacchi, 2017; Corrales and Penfold, 2007; Ellner, 2010, 
2019; McCoy and Myers, 2004). Moreover, apart from shaking domestic political discourses 
and institutions to their core, Chávez challenged the place of both Venezuela and Latin 
America within the liberal international world order (see Corrales and Penfold, 2011). This 
rupture with pre-existing discourses unleashed a process which was continued by his suc-
cessor, Nicolás Maduro, in an even more authoritarian manner and which has had far-reach-
ing and complicated political effects that are in need of closer examination. 
3. Humanitarianism and the Effects of Space-less/Time-less Narratives 
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This section highlights how numerous hemispheric leaders have drawn upon “human-
itarian” discourses to legitimize and rationalize their policy positioning vis-à-vis Venezuela, 
specifically the Maduro administration in early 2019. Overall, humanitarian discourses func-
tion as part of a greater process that constitutes bodies and places individual subjectivity 
within those bodies, thus resulting in a complicated process of embodiment that is neither 
apolitical nor objective (see Alexander, 1994, p. 14). More specifically, corporeally-centered 
discourses (such as international humanitarianism), and the resulting sanctions and interna-
tional interventions that these discourses help enact, portray individuals in a passive manner 
or to use Foucault’s term as “docile bodies” (1977), thereby curtailing their agency and cre-
ating an end-effect of violence or subjugation of “the other”. For instance, let us analyze 
some of the tweets4 offered by hemispheric leaders in support of interim president Juan 
Guaidó, such as Chilean President Sebastian Piñera on 30 April, 2019: 
We reiterate our full support for President Guaido and democracy in Ven-
ezuela. Maduro’s dictatorship must end through a peaceful force, and 
within the constitution, of the Venezuelan people. This will restore free-
doms, democracy, human rights and progress in Venezuela (El Comercio, 
2019). 
Or that of Colombian President Iván Duque on the same day: 
We call on the military and the people of Venezuela to be on the right side 
of history, rejecting dictatorship and the usurpation of Maduro; uniting in 
search of freedom, democracy and institutional reconstruction, headed by 
the Venezuelan National Assembly and President Juan Guaidó (El Comer-
cio, 2019). 
As has been argued by many scholars (see Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998; Vaughn, 2009), international humanitarian discourses are not a given, they have been 
gradually introduced and gradually imposed, and can be utilized to achieve both domestic 
and foreign political objectives. For instance, both Piñera and Duque have a strategic need 
to present themselves before their people as capable leaders who are responding promptly 
to the growing demands of Venezuelan migrants within their national borders. Calling upon 
an international humanitarian, or humanist, discourse also linguistically renders any actions 
they may undertake as inherently acceptable or well-intentioned, since these discourses 
draw upon a Kantian cosmopolitanism that views cross-border political action as having the 
possibility of improving the quality of human life. This is not to suggest that these world 
leaders have some nefarious or deeper, more sinister “real” intention; but rather to high-
light the automatically positive way in which their discourses are framed and how that gives 
them political leverage within both the domestic and the international political arenas. 
Piñera’s employment of a “human rights” trope and Duque’s reflection on “freedom, de-
mocracy, and institutional reconstruction” serve to label the Maduro administration as un-
able to provide these benefits for individual Venezuelans and could legitimize the use of 
                                                          
4 Tweets are particularly useful for the argument being laid out here, because they represent a segment or 
piece of discourse that is thrown simultaneously into all of time and space, and has the ability to reach thou-
sands, if not millions, of individuals. Tweets, much like discourses, can also be “deleted,” but once they have 
been published can never be completely erased, hence my employment of them here as pieces of qualitative 
data. Hashtags and abbreviations have been deleted from the tweets, so as to make them easier to read.  
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violence or the violation of another state’s sovereignty. Humanitarian discourses do not in-
herently lead to negative outcomes, but they do hold the potential for enacting violence and 
suffering upon human bodies. Coincidentally, these bodies are the same ones labeled by 
these discourses as deserving protection. Bodies then are not given – they are materialized 
and rendered through discursive practices, and oftentimes in multiple and contradictory 
ways (Butler, 1993). 
The employment of humanitarian discourses thus limits the agency of individual Ven-
ezuelan bodies as it discursively represents their subjectivity as something that has been 
taken away from them by the Maduro administration, and can only be returned once regime 
change occurs in Venezuela. For instance, the tweet of U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
on 30 April 2019 also encapsulates this line of reasoning: 
Today interim President Juan Guaido announced start of Operación Liber-
tad. The U.S. Government fully supports the Venezuelan people in their 
quest for freedom and democracy. Democracy cannot be defeated (El 
Comercio, 2019). 
Pompeo’s claims come off as dubious, at best, since he is an ex-CIA director and rep-
resents the administration of Donald Trump, which has made anti-immigrant rhetoric its 
policy hallmark. Furthermore, the nature of his humanitarian discourse and support for 
“people in their quest for freedom and democracy” deserves closer scrutiny, considering the 
Trump Administration has separated migrant children from their parents at the southern 
U.S. border in an effort to discourage immigration, with little regard for the possible long-
term psychological damage that this could cause. All hypocrisy aside, this example illustrates 
how different bodies in different spaces can be discursively rendered in contradictory and 
nuanced ways to serve specific political aims, even if the intentions of those aims are ques-
tionable or not. 
The efforts of Piñera, Duque5 and Pompeo to characterize the situation in Venezuela 
as one of excessive and intolerable human suffering, though, was countered by supporters 
of the Maduro administration, as can be seen, for example, in the tweet of Cuban President 
Miguel Díaz-Canel on 30 April 2019 as well: 
We reject this coup movement that aims to fill the country with violence. 
The traitors who have placed themselves at the forefront of this subversive 
movement have used troops and police with weapons of war on a public 
road in the city to create anxiety and terror (El Comercio, 2019). 
Díaz-Canel, through his words, attempts to invoke a counter-narrative of the interna-
tional humanitarian efforts of his fellow leaders as one of violence and increased suffering, 
thus articulating the agency and bodies of Venezuelan individuals in yet another manner. 
Thus, the situation in Venezuela gives all parties an opportunity to present themselves be-
fore their people as the “true” defenders and protectors of human rights and humanitarian 
interests. Moreover, their present political stance in defense of the Venezuelan people 
could possibly be used in the future, by any of these leaders, from Díaz-Canel to Duque, as 
a tool to legitimize their curtailing of civil liberties or violating human rights in defense of 
                                                          
5 Chile, Ecuador, and Peru have all moved recently to make it more difficult for Venezuelans to enter their 
national territory and to obtain legal work permits, while simultaneously championing the humanitarian 
cause of Venezuelan refugees. 
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Venezuelan, or another group of people. Likewise, these all-encompassing humanitarian 
narratives leave out the hierarchies and differences that exist within and between Venezue-
lan migrants across Latin America and the U.S., and that are based on race, gender, class, 
etc. Left out are also the words and personal feelings of the Venezuelan people and how 
they interpret and respond to these humanitarian discourses that are being placed upon 
them by various local and international political actors. These discourses in turn create a 
common center and identity around which all Venezuelans, and their agency, can be read 
and decoded, temporarily constituting them as oppressed people in search of freedom; yet 
the possibility for a shift in those discourses and a securitization of Venezuelan bodies still 
lingers. 
The point is not to degrade the humanitarian efforts of any of these leaders; in fact, a 
recent Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) report (Ramsey and Sánchez-Garzoli, 
2018) has lauded many Colombian and Brazilian officials for their humane responses to Ven-
ezuelan migrants. Instead, my aim is to underscore the internal contradictions these dis-
courses hold and to deconstruct them in order to show how they give temporary stability to 
the public image of certain individuals and to the national identity of these countries, by 
extension. Venezuela provides Colombia, Peru, Chile, and so forth (and their respective cit-
izenries) with a political center around which to rally and achieve specific (inter)national 
aims, such as increased standing or increased spending. Meanwhile, Venezuela also pro-
vides the same impetus for Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia as they draw upon the image of an 
anti-U.S. and anti-imperialism crusade to justify their public policy actions. In short, Human-
itarian discourses lead to greater discourses in terms of space and time that serve to order 
how political processes are conducted. 
Space-less 
To illustrate my argument about “space” and its function within the current situation 
in Venezuelan, and more broadly within IR, I reflect on a specific incident that occurred in 
the Brazilian town of Pacaraima, which sits close to the border with Venezuela. In August 
2018, a mob of furious Brazilians went into the tenement housing built by Venezuelan asy-
lum-seekers and set it ablaze, proceeding to violently chase the migrants back across the 
border into Venezuela as they chanted the Brazilian national anthem (Tsavkko Garcia, 2018). 
The then-governor of the state of Roraima, where Pacaraima is located, Suely Campos of 
the conservative right-wing Progressive Party (PP) in turn called upon the Brazilian federal 
government to close the border with Venezuela in an effort to stop the flow of asylum-seek-
ers and institute “security” and stability (Tsavkko Garcia, 2018). For the case in point, let us 
examine Governor Campos’ tweet6 on 18 April, 2018: 
I was in Pacaraima today inspecting the border with Venezuela, after the 
motion I filed with the Supreme Court [to close the border]. 600 to 800 
immigrants come in daily and less than 1/3 get a measles vaccine. The Un-
ion [Brazilian federal government] has not made this mandatory and so far 
has not manifested itself about making the vaccine mandatory (brackets 
mine). 
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The purpose of these anecdotes is to showcase how important conceptions of space 
have been for determining the actions of some individuals in response to Venezuela’s cur-
rent situation. As presented earlier, IR is a field primarily concerned with security and who 
is the proper object upon which to enact said security, whether that be individuals, states, 
etc. Socially conceived notions of space are inherently tied to this process, as IR attempts to 
establish coherent and finite delineations of space through imaginary boundaries. These 
boundaries then extend towards which bodies are allowed to take up space within the (in-
ter)national space and how they are allowed to do so, for example stereotyped notions of 
diseased outsiders v. non-diseased insiders, as the governor’s words above seem to suggest. 
Secondly, the preoccupation with spatial integrity and security is an extension of concerns 
about the human body and destiny, as argued by Nietzsche, and it circuitously gives agents 
and states a feeling of security in terms of their identity, standing, and future (see Der 
Derian, 2009, p. 155-159). 
Therefore, millions of Venezuelans leaving a predefined space that has been ontolog-
ically predetermined as “theirs” and entering other spaces inherently arouses (in)security 
threats and discursive practices as was outlined above in terms of humanitarianism. Fur-
thermore, “responding” to the influx of Venezuelan migrants gives individual states an op-
portunity to (re)assert their borders, their sense of self, and their ontological completeness. 
Thomas Nail defines borders by stating: “The border is ‘a process of social division.’ What all 
borders share in common, following this definition, is that they introduce a division or bifur-
cation of some sort into the world” (2016, p. 2). “Sense of self” can be taken in this context 
to mean possessing control over a parcel of space that a group inherently feels ownership 
and/or protectorship over. Thus, Governor Campos, despite being a woman, did not employ 
any humanitarian or feminized discourses to support her policy stance towards Venezuelan 
refugees, many of whom are women and children. On the contrary, to rationalize her ac-
tions, Campos called upon masculine conceptions of the nation-state and homeland as a 
territory that must be defended from outside intruders. The demonstrators who burned 
down temporary housing units and sang the Brazilian national anthem as they chased Ven-
ezuelans out of “their” space also invoked this same line of reasoning. I present here exam-
ples from Brazil, but similar xenophobic incidents, stemming from gendered and fixed no-
tions of space, border, and nation, have been noted everywhere Venezuelans have sought 
refuge. 
By “space-less” I mean that space possesses a continual and inherent quality in the 
way it drives the human psyche to partition the world and enact social divisions that must 
then be defended through violent practices in the creation of “self” and “other”, or “insider” 
and “outsider”. This process, though, is not universally encompassing and is subject, ironi-
cally, to changes across space. For instance, the legacy of white settler colonialism in Latin 
America has purposefully left blurry and difficult-to-defend borders that function to obfus-
cate social inequality. Historic problems around land demarcation and border fixing in Latin 
America even caused tension among the region’s right-wing military dictatorships during 
the Cold War and have sparked numerous inter-state conflicts (see Centeno, 2002; Mares, 
2001). From the Treaty of Tordesillas, to the diplomatic efforts of the Baron of Rio Branco at 
the turn of the 20th century, to the current situation in Venezuela, Latin American politics 
has been marked by an incessant and cumbersome need to make sense out of space. 
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The well-televised clash in February 2019 at the bridge between Colombia and Vene-
zuela, where humanitarian aid was prevented from going into Venezuela is yet another ex-
ample of how space and its representation plays a role in shaping Latin American political 
processes (Casey, 2019). The bridge incident gave both Colombian and Venezuelan leaders 
an opportunity to demonstrate their masculinity, draw upon their national identity, and 
temporarily enact a well-defined border between the two countries. Much of the debate 
about the situation in Venezuela also carries out these objectives, while reiterating the cen-
trality of “the state” within global politics and giving it a concrete and perennial appearance, 
despite its abstract and imaginary state of being. IR, and in general diplomatic efforts, can 
be taken as a continuous process through which society reiterates its commitment to states 
as the proper way to divide space, and to individuals, from each other, thereby consecrating 
imaginary differences that are taken as central and determining of policy and politics. But 
as Nail argues, “the border is not reducible to space” (2016, p. 9), implying that time and 
other social constitutions play a role in the creation of states, bodies, and social division. 
Time-less 
Similarly to how space and its concurrent effects for IR are often-ignored variables 
within mainstream scholarship, the same reading can be made of “time”. Within most pos-
itivist approaches to IR, time is taken as just there, running its course across the face of a 
clock with little effect on the framing and outcomes of human events. As R.B.J. Walker 
(1993) has pointed out, time is infused within IR theories typically as either marching to-
wards a Judeo-Christian notion of salvation and redemption (neo-liberalism), or as function-
ing in a cyclical manner of repeated Greco-Roman tragedy (neo-realism), both stemming 
from a Western psychoanalytical basis. Our understanding of the “development” of time 
greatly shifts when one begins to view it as a socially constituted discourse that works to 
regiment how human beings experience and decipher events. Time has the ability to appear 
static, progressive, and/or cyclical, all at once – thus scaffolding our perception of politics. 
With regard to the current situation in Venezuela, this process is being played out 
constantly. For example, time is static for the millions of Venezuelan migrants scattered 
across the globe who view the situation in their homeland as a constant scenario of hyper-
inflation, crisis, and destruction. For them, the “reconstruction” of their lives and self-images 
will be an arduous process as they attempt to integrate themselves into new societies. This 
process may ultimately prove futile as they may be permanently caught in a desire to return 
to a different time that does not exist: a pre-crisis Venezuela. For others, such as the U.S. 
government, time here functions in a progressive manner, allowing it to legitimize calls for 
regime change or violent engagements with/within Venezuela in an effort to bring about an 
“inevitable” alteration in the course of Venezuelan, hemispheric, and global history. 
Finally, for many others time also appears simultaneously in a cyclical manner as it 
allows them to symbolically represent their stance vis-à-vis the situation in Venezuela in 
historic terms that have been previously utilized to discursively constitute Latin American 
realities. Specifically, a Cold War discourse has been employed to divide the debate here as 
between democracy/dictatorship, communism/capitalism, freedom/oppression, right/left, 
and so forth. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the red scare it jointly represents 
with Cuba has maintained a durable quality in its ability to galvanize political action through-
out Latin America and set the parameters for what is, and what is not, acceptable behavior. 
To show this, below is the tweet of Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, also on 30 April, 2019, 
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where he points out the support of Brazilian left-wing political parties for the Maduro ad-
ministration in an effort to position himself both domestically and internationally: 
Brazil sympathizes with the suffering Venezuelan people enslaved by a dic-
tator supported by the PT [Worker’s Party], PSOL [Socialism and Liberty 
Party] and their ideological allies. We support the freedom of this sister 
nation to finally live a true democracy (El Comercio, 2019, brackets mine). 
The framing of the situation in Venezuelan as a Cold War struggle between polar op-
posite entities has been a ubiquitous feature of this on-going struggle because it conditions 
individuals on how to act, think, and respond to events.7 Violent domestic clashes within 
Venezuela between the police and protestors then call to mind the Hungarian Revolution of 
1956 or the Prague Spring of 1968, and in spite of the distance between these events in 
physical/linear time, they become closely related in the way people experience their tem-
porality. The symbolic positioning of Venezuela within a Cold War discourse is not recent, 
though, as it has been employed since Hugo Chávez’s early days in office and throughout 
the entire “Pink Tide” wave of governments, to explain the mentality of these Latin Ameri-
can leaders. The Cold War is both simultaneously over and still underway across the hemi-
sphere as it can be deployed to discursively make sense of political events, even though it 
has technically been relegated to history books. The same line of reasoning is present, but 
from a contradictory perspective, in the words of Bolivian President Evo Morales from 30 
April, 2019, as well: 
We energetically condemn the coup attempt in Venezuela, by the right that 
is submissive to foreign interests. Surely, the courageous Bolivarian Revo-
lution, headed by brother Nicolas Maduro, will impose itself against this 
new attack by the empire (El Comercio, 2019). 
The word “empire” brings to mind multiple images and discourses of foreign aggres-
sion and intervention, and has been used widely since the Cold War against presumed for-
eign adversaries. The point in the preceding sections has been overall to delineate humani-
tarian discourses and then place them within a post-structuralist conceptualization of space 
and time to show how these variables come together to partially render Venezuelans as 
docile bodies within global politics. Docile bodies that can be used for political ends – by 
every party involved – as they further state-centric visions of (inter)national power and aid 
in the production of Shapiro’s violent cartographies. 
4. Multilateralism and the Future of Global Hegemony 
Now I turn my discussion towards a closer examination of “multilateralism” in this 
context, to then place my arguments within the greater IR debate about global hegemony 
and power at the beginning of the 21st century. Multilateralism is generally seen as a positive 
force that seeks to reinforce the international liberal world order. When individuals conjure 
images of multilateralism in their psyche, they typically picture the United Nations, G8 meet-
ings, or international conferences designed to address the “big questions” of global govern-
ance. According to neoliberals, multilateralism and its resultant cooperation are some of the 
                                                          
7 Likewise, Maduro’s government is able to internally enact a cyclical discourse of U.S. imperialism and ag-
gression to explain and decode the present situation.  
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key forces that work to cement global order. I, however, suggest that instead of viewing 
multilateralism as something of the center-left (think UNHCR) or a force that joins right and 
left (think BRICS), we conceptualize it as a force that can work from any point of the political 
spectrum, or across it, to achieve political aims. 
For instance, Trump and his foreign policy approach have generally been seen as pos-
sessing a strong dislike and aversion towards multilateralism. This view though is myopic 
because, although Trump has shown distaste for specific types of multilateralism, mainly 
forums he perceives as leftist or presenting undue burdens, such as the Paris Climate Agree-
ment or NATO; he has still been willing to participate in them or entertain efforts which he 
views as favorable to his personal standing. Venezuela is a good example of this, since Trump 
views regime change in Venezuela as having great potential and providing ample opportu-
nities for U.S. strategic and economic interests, which include but go well beyond oil. To 
achieve regime change in Venezuela, the Trump Administration has joined right-wing lead-
ers in Chile (Piñera), Colombia (Duque), Brazil (Bolsonaro), and so forth, displaying a cordial 
manner of engagement that he has not demonstrated towards Angela Merkel or Enrique 
Peña Nieto, for example. Multilateralism, done well, typically tends to present participants 
with certain discursive benefits: 1) presenting them as engaged world leaders that have “a 
seat at the table” in important decision-making processes, 2) providing them with a cover 
for domestic policy actions, and 3) allowing them to reassure their domestic political status 
because they possess some kind of information, knowledge, or credibility that others lack. 
In other words, for individuals like Duque or Piñera, engaging with Trump on the per-
ceived threat to hemispheric democracy and stability that is Venezuela, allows them to pre-
sent themselves before their domestic constituencies in a masculine light as defender of 
noble causes and the physical integrity of the homeland. This masculine image could then 
be used discursively to push for other policy proposals or reforms, or even to justify violent 
domestic or international actions. Masculinity can also be translated from discursive into 
concrete advantages, as leaders who are perceived as taking “tough” stances are typically 
better assessed than those that are viewed as “weak”. Proximity to the hegemon and its 
military power also creates a certain image and possibility for spillover of technological, mil-
itary, and economic benefits. Participating with the U.S. in its crusade to rid South America 
of a perceived communist menace allows these Latin American states and their leaders to 
reassert their core identity and view of themselves, while their extensions and peripheral 
boundaries extend discursively towards that of the regional hegemon creating a mixed self-
image. Engagement in multilateralism blurs time and space, and leads to a semblance where 
it is increasingly difficult to separate the U.S. from Colombia, or Brazil, and so forth, in terms 
of who is acting or making decisions, and who is to receive blame or credit for outcomes. 
Multilateralism shakes the apparent structure of states as it brings them closer to 
some states and individuals, discursively speaking at least, and creates the illusion of dis-
tance from others. Multilateralism, thus, holds the potential to make leaders and states feel 
encouraged in their ontological sense of themselves and their identity, and even more im-
portantly it affords a fledging (but often intense) notion of security through the bonds and 
connections it tenuously builds (Mitzen, 2006). Through this case study of Venezuela, one 
can observe how multilateralism both shakes and stabilizes the imagined/abstract compo-
sitions of individuals, states, and the international system, and how it is one of many modes 
or types of discourses that are utilized for that end. My focus here has been on outlining 
how the Trump administration and its center-right allies have embarked on this process to 
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displace the Maduro administration, but the same analysis can be made of the multilateral-
ism that has been inspired in Venezuela and its allies during the past two decades. For in-
stance, through multilateral forums, such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA), Venezuela has also been able to engage in a discursive rendering of itself 
as closer to (and further away) from certain states, as well as defender of particular princi-
ples. This goes back to my initial point that multilateralism should not be viewed as having 
a partisan or ideological face, as it can be molded to serve numerous discourses and political 
objectives: some humanitarian, some non-humanitarian, and some even both of these con-
comitantly. Stated differently, the field of IR must decouple multilateralism from its tradi-
tional normative connotations and view it a political process whereby leaders and states 
frame particular narratives, while excluding others. 
Turning towards the U.S. specifically, the current situation in Venezuela affords it 
some distinctive discursive and strategic opportunities to make up for losses elsewhere in 
terms of its identity and sense of place within the international system. Moreover, involve-
ment in Venezuelan affairs allows the U.S. to smooth out, or paint differently, at least one 
small part of its violent cartography, which has become particularly gruesome since the be-
ginning of George W. Bush’s global war on terror and the invasion of Iraq. More concretely, 
in a world where the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the discourse it sought to enact have 
failed (due to Trump’s own handling), but where the Chinese Road and Belt initiatives are 
thriving, the U.S. – simply put – needs a win. By “win” here I mean an area of the world 
where it can reaffirm its masculinity and hegemony and feel, at least temporarily and spa-
tially, secure in its self-image and future. Latin America has historically been the place where 
the U.S. has tested its hegemonic capacities and strategies and where it has gone back to 
after setbacks in other locations to regain its lost sense of self. Or as Cynthia Weber writes: 
Caribbean cases could be paired with other U.S. concerns, reading, for ex-
ample, the Cuban case in the context of the Cold War generally, the Do-
minican invasion as “Vietnam writ small” (Wiarda, 1975: 835)… Grenada as 
a simulated success in light of the failures in Lebanon and Nicaragua, Pan-
ama as a preface to the Persian Gulf War, and Haiti as a diplomatic success 
to balance out the diplomatic failures in Bosnia (Weber 1999, p. 5). 
Could Venezuela then be an opportunity to discursively make up for U.S. failure, or 
inability, to act in Syria, Crimea, or other places? If Obama unsuccessfully pivoted to Asia, 
could Trump then be pivoting towards Latin America as the place to remake the image of 
U.S. hegemony in the 21st century’s multipolar world order? This pivot, though, may not be 
welcome by all in the region, as it holds the potential for violence; but it may become a 
cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy initiatives nonetheless with an upcoming presidential 
election in 2020. Trump kicked off his last precedential campaign attacking Mexican immi-
grants and has made curtailing immigration from Latin America a central narrative of his 
administration. He is keenly aware of the utility that Latin America holds for advancing po-
litical narratives within the U.S.’s intertwined domestic/foreign political spheres. Trump’s 
sudden empathy for the suffering of the Venezuelan people might at first seem paradoxical, 
considering his disregard for the thousands of immigrants pleading for help at the southern 
U.S. border, but both of these processes are deeply connected, because they function in 
tandem to legitimize policies, violence, and continued regional hegemony. Moreover, the 
U.S. is not the only global power involved, as both China and Russia are closely engaged with 
Venezuela through their multilateral efforts and will read the outcome of events there as a 
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measure of continued U.S. influence, or lack thereof, in the region. In summary, this section 
has focused on delineating how multilateralism can come from all sides and function in the 
production of global hegemonic narratives as it partially assists in the constitution of indi-
viduals, states, and the international system. 
5. Conclusion, or “Chronicle of a Death Foretold” 
In November 2005, Chávez famously declared at the Summit of the Americas meeting 
in Mar del Plata, Argentina that he was there to bury the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
agreement (Smith 2008, p. 353-354). Chávez might have been correct in the short-term as 
he and other Pink Tide leaders strategically and discursively out-maneuvered the Bush Ad-
ministration and thwarted the negotiations; but they ultimately failed to upend U.S. regional 
hegemony. Latin America enjoyed a considerable level of egalitarianism in the early post-
Cold War environment of the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992), which encouraged oppor-
tunities for (inter-)regional cooperation. However, the region’s long-term policy options 
might be curtailed by an anxious U.S. foreign policy community that increasingly perceives 
the global multipolar order as turning against it, with the apparent rise of China and other 
actors. 
In this article, I employed Waltz’s three images and deconstructed them by arguing 
that they are not mutually exclusive levels, but rather discursively co-constituted entities 
that reinforce and affect each other. From there, my analysis outlined how individual Vene-
zuelan refugees can be painted within grand narratives that exclude hierarchy and nuance, 
or within contradictory humanitarian discourses that demonstrate how bodies are at the 
fore-front of global power rivalries. What is more, this study nuanced our collective ap-
proach towards time, space, and multilateralism, as well as their subsequent impact on in-
ternational politics and security. Returning to Hansen, she argues that a post-structuralism 
approach to security underscores a difficulty in political decision-making, because it does 
not lead to scant and diametrically opposed policy options that leaders can mechanically 
select from. On the contrary, post-structuralism challenges us to revisit our epistemology 
and ontology and leaves numerous policy options open (Hansen 1997: 384). In many ways, 
that has been my objective here as I described the paradoxes and incongruences that make 
up today’s “crisis” in Venezuela by focusing on the relations of power and identities that it 
helps to both stabilize and alter. Hopefully, the preceding sections have functioned to inter-
pret the current “crisis” in Venezuela as not a singular event or series of events, but rather 
as the product of various and opposed discourses that shift depending on one’s vantage 
point. I do not claim to have clairvoyant abilities to decide what the future will hold for Ven-
ezuela, but we can be certain that the struggle for Venezuela will continue as part of various 
violent cartographies and processes that seek to reaffirm Latin America’s place within the 
global order. 
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